Primordial Morality

"Lucretia" by Bassano (16th/17th century)

One sometimes encounters the notion that Christian values are foundational aspects of contemporary Western culture, but if this is so what happens when Westerners stop being Christians in large numbers? I have relatives who believe that within 3-5 generations without Christianity human behaviour will devolve into a hellscape, and fathers will start initiating their daughters into sex. I have total confidence that this will not happen (at least not commonly – such behaviour will continue to be regarded as aberrant and wicked). Not because I have confidence in any other particular moral code prevailing but because I suspect that most people have a gut instinct for what is fundamentally right and wrong, and that where that instinct is absent reason can fill in the gaps – absent other factors which may cause reason to lapse (such as rigid belief systems, psychological scarring, brain damage and general low intelligence – unfortunately all of these things are fairly common). What might ethics in a post-Christian world look like? Looking to European notions of virtue before Christianity prevailed may give us an idea, as may looking deeper into our own selves.

Roman Virtue

Ancient Roman polytheism was primarily concerned with the proper conduct of ritual rather than personal morality, but meritorious conduct was not entirely divorced from the realm of the religious, as Cicero lets us know in On the Laws. In that work people living in an ideal society are described in the following way:

“Let them worship deities … who have won a place in heaven through their merits, such as Hercules, Liber, Aesculapius, Castor, Pollux and Quirinus; and those qualities through which men may gain access to heaven – Mens <Mind>, Virtus <Virtue>, Pietas <Piety>, Fides <Faith>; of these virtues let there be shrines but none of any of the vices … Let sacrilege committed that cannot be expiated be deemed impious …

Except for the servants of the Magna Mater – and they only on their fixed days – let no one beg for contributions. He who steals or takes away what is sacred or in trust in a public place, let him count as a parricide. For perjury the punishment is destruction from the Gods, shame from men. The pontifices [priests] shall punish incest with the capital penalty … Let them fulfil vows scrupulously … Let them treat their dead kinsfolk as divine. Let there be limits to expenditure and mourning for them [cited in Beard, North and Price, Vol 2, at 353-355]”.

From this we see that Cicero condemned begging, stealing, killing family members, lying under oath, incest and excessive mourning rites. He praised:

• The healthy mind, which a Roman would understand to include intelligence and mental courage.
• Piety, meaning unflinching devotion and loyalty to family, friends, country and Gods.
• Faithfulness, by which is meant trustworthiness and reliability.

Cicero’s thought draws not only from his Roman cultural values but from Hellenic philosophy. Throughout the Roman era there were two philosophical schools that were particularly dominant, they being Epicureanism and Stoicism (and Cicero studied both). Epicureanism holds that fear of divine wrath and the possibility of an unpleasant afterlife poisons human happiness; the remedy is to know that Gods do not concern themselves with our lives and there is no afterlife. Rather, the Gods live overwhelmingly happy lives because they are virtuous, and so should we, ie, we should seek to free ourselves from superstition, fears and sorrow, and we should strive to be rational, modest, frugal and clean, while taking pleasure in simple things, such as friendship, gardens and plain food. For Epicureans the vices of man include lust, fear, pride, filth, wantonness, luxury and sloth – to master them is to live like a God (Lucretius at 138). Stoicism has different underpinnings (focusing on the power of human reason in a world saturated by the divine; the end goal is apatheia, being a mind freed from disabling passions) but the Stoic concept of behavioural virtue is similar. Marcus Aurelius summarises that which is both praiseworthy and blameful in his Meditations:

“… display the qualities that are wholly within your power, sincerity, dignity, endurance, disdain for sensual pleasure, satisfaction with your lot, contentment with little, kindness, freedom, frugality, avoidance of idle chatter, and elevation of mind … Or are you compelled to grumble, to be grasping, to flatter others, to heap criticism on your poor body, to be ingratiating, and boastful, and restless in your mind … [Book 5.5].”

All of the above discussion on Roman virtue is male-centred, but Roman ideas about feminine virtue appear to have not been so very different. Ancient Roman eulogies in praise of women emphasise the virtues of modesty, moral integrity, chastity, diligence, loyalty, hard work, wisdom, affability, religiosity without superstition, elegance, simplicity of dress and, less appealingly, obedience and wool-working (cited in Shelton at 291-292).

Germanic Virtue

Pre-Christian Germanic people traditionally had more of an honour code than a moral one; their notion of virtue was perhaps more akin to Nietzschean “master morality” than morality as conventionally thought of today. The Havamal (“Sayings of the High One”, ie, of Odin) is probably the best source we have for determining what honour looked like; it makes up part of what is variously called either the Poetic Edda or the Elder Edda within the Codex Regius. The Havamal is not really about prescribing honour, much less virtue, rather it is a series of verses said to be composed by the God of Wisdom (Odin) that seem not intended to be prescriptive so much as inspirational and reflective. With that in mind it appears from the Havamal that the following were considered wise, if not virtuous:

• Don’t drink to get drunk (verses 12-13 and 19).
• Don’t be a glutton (verses 20-21).
• Don’t be garrulous (verses 15, 19, 27, 29 and 125).
• Don’t get too close to the wife of another man (verses 115 and 131)
• Don’t be miserly (verse 40).
• Be generous with your loved ones (verses 40, 48 and 78).
• Be loyal to your friends and regularly exchange gifts (verses 41-42, 43-44, 50 and 121).
• Be good to your guests (verses 2-4, 132 and 135) but don’t be a guest for too long (verse 35).
• Be bold in battle and not cowardly (verses 15-16 and 48).
• Be wary and prudent, but not anxious and fearful (verses 15-16, 23 and 85-88).
• Stand tall, cast off shame and despair (verses 61, 69, 71, 75 and 133).

Interestingly, and in contrast with what generally passes for virtue today, being utterly ruthless in relation to one’s enemies is praised in the Havamal (verse 127 – “grant no peace to your foes”), as is deceptive behaviour:

“42. To his friend a man must be a friend, and repay gift for gift; laughter for laughter folk should receive, and also falseness for lies …

45. If you’ve another that you trust ill, but from him want nothing but good: you must speak him fair and think him a fraud, and give him falseness for lies.

46. Another thing about him that you trust ill, and have no faith in his thoughts: you must smile at him and not speak your mind, gifts should be repaid in kind.”

To give some context though – trustworthiness and loyalty are highly valued in the Havamal. Figuring out who is trustworthy and worthy of loyalty is an aspect of wisdom – the trustworthiness of others, especially strangers, is not assumed, and trusting the wrong person could be deadly. The violence of the age is emphasised in verse 58:

“He must rise early, who will take another’s life or goods; a wolf lying down seldom gets the ham nor a sleeping man victory.”

Primordial Morality

Verse 58 of the Havamal implies that murder and theft are things a pre-Christian Germanic man might consider as a legitimate course of action (unless against one to whom he owes loyalty), and history is awash with examples of Vikings who did just this – many times. So their concept of morality was clearly at odds with contemporary notions, but the concept of an undefined goodness is there:

“128. … never be made happy by wicked things, but make yourself glad at the good.”

The surrounding text in the Havamal give us some idea of what wickedness and goodness might be (as described above) but I honestly think there is more to this. When you speak to atheists it is common for them to say that they don’t need religion to tell them what is right and wrong, they can act ethically anyway. I have observed that this is mostly true. The question then becomes, well why is that? I do not believe the charge of some that it is merely the lingering aftertaste of Judeo-Christian values, nor have I noticed atheists flocking to read books on philosophy so that they might settle on a code of ethics. No, I think they have an intrinsic sense of right and wrong, as do I, as do most people who are not fundamentally damaged or brainwashed. I would like to call this primordial morality, and suspect that this is hardwired (through evolution) into most people to the point that it is instinctual, but that it can be overridden when people become denatured, eg, by adopting fanatical beliefs, or through severe psychological damage or actual brain damage.

Having thought about this for weeks and discussed it with a number of people I think primordial morality, or instinctual morality, might encompass the following:

• Protect the young – spurning incest between children and parents is a fundamental aspect of this, but so to is feeding, clothing and caring for familial children, and at least to some extent it implies a more benevolent disposition towards all young children (compared to adults) one comes into contact with. The evolutionary utility of this is clear.
• Avoid gratuitous cruelty – an example is don’t kill a koala for no reason, because this just feels fundamentally wrong. Possibly this is a sort of primal understanding that making enemies for no good reason is contrary to the instinct to survive. We need as few enemies as possible and all the friends we can get – and animals most certainly can be our friends (our longstanding relationship with dogs is perhaps the best example of that).
• Be loyal to loved ones – usually they are family and close friends, but of course this can and does fracture in contemporary society, possibly because we are now at greater liberty to choose our allegiances than in the tribal past; the instinct then is to be consistently loyal to the people one has elected to love, such as close family members (in whom one has not become bitterly disappointed), one’s lover and certain friends. Clearly this instinct to be loyal has some connection to our evolutionary status as animals who thrive in social groups and become utterly vulnerable when solo. 

As it says in the Havamal:

“50. The withered fir tree which stands in the mound; neither bark or needles protect it; so it is for the man whom no one loves, why should he live for long?”

Over and above these three fundamental virtues it may be that industriousness and courage are primal morals – because they are highly regarded across cultures – but if they are they are at the sliding end of primordial morality, as laziness and cowardice are commonplace.

The Importance of Reason in Determining Right Action

Once one has slid off primordial morality altogether other factors inform human action, such as ever-changing cultural values, enforceable laws, and the need to avoid that which is stupid. At this point we need to use our (sometimes fallible) ability to reason. Bringing back the koala into the scheme of morality – my gut (by which I mean everything in my being, so my instincts, or my primal morality) tells me it is wrong to kill a koala for no reason other than that I can; but if I am hungry and there is nothing else to eat killing a koala for food is not wrong (I would, and many people would, say). However, destroying koala habitat, which leads to koala death and is lamentably common, is not so much primordially wrong as stupid. The probable result of koala death following habitat destruction introduces the element of moral wrong, but it is so diluted through the prism of diffuse responsibility that it loses force, for do we blame the politicians for passing laws that allow excessive land-clearing, the corporations that buy the land and initiate the clearing of it (which members of the company then?), the woodcutters, or the people who buy a home built on the cleared land? Only an intelligent solution can solve this sort of ongoing problem, not gut instincts, and therein lies the challenge.

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Sources: 

• Beard, North & Price, Religions of Rome (Vol 2), Cambridge
• Crawford, Honour and Shame in Norse Society, youtube
• Larrington (trans), The Poetic Edda, Oxford
• Lucretius, On the Nature of the Universe, Oxford
• Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, Oxford
• Neo polytheist (ie, I looked back on information in some of my earlier posts in this blog)
  
• Orchard (trans), The Elder Edda, Penguin
• Shelton, As the Romans Did, Oxford
• Urmson & Ree, The Concise Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers, Routledge
• Warrior, Roman Religion, Focus

Written by M' Sentia Figula (aka Freki), find me at neo polytheist and romanpagan.wordpress.com